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Liquidity in the Foreign Exchange Market:
Measurement, Commonality, and Risk Premiums
Abstract
A daily return reversal measure of liquidity is developed and estimated using a new compre-
hensive ultra-high frequency data set of foreign exchange rates during the ﬁnancial crisis period of
2007–2008. The measure captures market participants’ perception of periods with high and low
liquidity in the expected manner. Tests for commonality in foreign exchange (FX) liquidity show
that liquidity co-moves strongly across currencies. Systematic FX liquidity decreases dramatically
during the subprime crisis, especially after the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
To investigate whether there exists a return premium for illiquidity, a factor model similar to
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) is augmented by a liquidity risk factor constructed from
shocks to systematic liquidity. Empirical results indicate that liquidity risk is a heavily priced
state variable important for the determination of FX returns. Previously identiﬁed risk factors
such as the carry trade and market risk factors are no longer signiﬁcant once common liquidity
risk is incorporated in the asset pricing model. This ﬁnding helps to explain deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity as classical tests do not include liquidity risk.
Keywords: Foreign Exchange Market, Liquidity, Uncovered Interest Rate Parity,
Commonality in Liquidity, Liquidity Risk Premium, Subprime Crisis
JEL Codes: G01, G12, G15, F31
1. Introduction
Recent events during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–? have highlighted the fact that liquidity is a crucial
yet elusive concept in all ﬁnancial markets. With unprecedented coordinated eﬀorts, central banks
around the world had to stabilize the ﬁnancial system by injecting billions of US dollars to restore
liquidity. According to the Federal Reserves’s chairman Ben Bernanke, “weak liquidity risk controls
were a common source of the problems many ﬁrms have faced [throughout the crisis]” (Bernanke,
2008). Therefore, measuring liquidity and evaluating exposure to liquidity risk is of relevance not
only for investors, but also for central bankers, regulators, as well as academics.
As a consequence of its crucial role in general and the potential of leading to devastating losses in
particular, the concept of liquidity has been studied extensively in equity markets. However, liquidity
in the foreign exchange (FX) market has mostly been neglected, although it is by far the world’s
largest ﬁnancial market. The estimated average daily turnover of more than 3.2 trillion US dollar
in 2007 (Bank for International Settlements, 2007) corresponds to almost eight times that of global
equity markets (World Federation of Exchanges, 2008). A large variety of FX traders ranging from
hedge funds to central banks is dispersed around the globe, keeping the market open 24 hours a day.
Despite the fact that the FX market is commonly regarded as the most liquid ﬁnancial market,
events during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–? and recent studies on currency crashes (Brunnermeier,
Nagel, and Pedersen, 2009) highlight the importance of liquidity in FX markets. Similarly, Burnside
(2009) argues that liquidity frictions have the potential to play a crucial role in explaining the
proﬁtability of carry trades. In line with Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), “liquidity spirals”
aggravate currency crashes and pose a great risk to carry traders. Therefore, investors require to be
able to carefully monitor FX liquidity as they are averse to liquidity shocks.
Given the lack of previous studies and the importance of currency markets, the main contribution
of this paper is to develop a liquidity measure particularly tailored to the FX market, to quantify the
amount of commonality in liquidity across diﬀerent exchange rates, and to determine the extent of
liquidity risk premiums embedded in foreign exchange returns. To that end, a daily return reversal
liquidity measure (Pa´stor and Stambaugh, 2003) accounting for the important role of contempora-
neous order ﬂow in the determination of exchange rates (Evans and Lyons, 2002) is developed and
estimated using a new comprehensive data set including ultra high frequency return and order ﬂow
data for nine major exchange rates. Ranging from January 2007 to December 2008, the sample
covers the ﬁnancial crisis during which illiquidity played a major role. Thus, this period of distressed
market conditions is highly relevant to analyze liquidity, compensating for the fact that the sample
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extends over two years only. The proposed liquidity measure is based on structural microstructure
models featuring a dichotomy between the fundamental price and the observed price. Empirically,
the measure captures market participants’ perception of periods with high and low liquidity in the
expected manner. For instance, EUR/USD is found to be the most liquid exchange rate and liquidity
of all currency pairs decreases during the ﬁnancial crisis.
Testing for commonality in FX liquidity is crucial as sudden shocks to market-wide liquidity
have important implications for regulators as well as investors. Regulators are concerned about
the stability of ﬁnancial markets, whereas investors worry about the risk–return proﬁle of their asset
allocation. Therefore, a time-series of systematic FX liquidity is constructed representing the common
component in liquidity across diﬀerent exchange rates. In line with expectations, results show that
liquidity co-moves strongly across currencies. Systematic FX liquidity decreases dramatically during
the ﬁnancial crisis, especially after the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
The last part of the paper investigates whether there exists a return premium for illiquidity. A
factor model similar to Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) is augmented by a liquidity risk
factor constructed from unexpected shocks to systematic liquidity. Estimation results indicate that
liquidity risk is a heavily priced state variable important for the determination of FX returns. This
ﬁnding helps to explain deviations from Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) as classical tests do
not include liquidity risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the following section literature related
to the paper at hand will be summarized. In Section 2, a return reversal measure of liquidity will
be derived and alternative intraday measures of liquidity will be presented. Liquidity in the FX
market will be investigated empirically in Section 3. Section 4 introduces measures for systematic
liquidity and documents commonality in liquidity between diﬀerent currencies. Evidence indicating
the presence of a return premium for systematic liquidity risk in the cross-section of exchange rates
as well as robustness checks are presented in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
1.1. Related Literature
First and foremost this paper is related to the substantial strain of literature dealing with liquidity
in equity markets. Motivated by the theoretical model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), various
authors have developed measures of liquidity for diﬀerent time horizons. Among others, Chordia,
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) use trading activity and transaction cost measures to derive daily
estimates of liquidity from intraday data. In case only daily data is available, the eﬀective cost of
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trades can be estimated by relying on the spread model presented by Roll (1984). Alternatively,
Amihud (2002) advocates a measure of illiquidity computed as the average ratio of absolute stock
return to its trading volume, which can be interpreted as a proxy of price impact. Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003) suggest a measure of stock market liquidity based on return reversal, summarizing
the link between returns and lagged order ﬂow.
Additionally, commonality in liquidity of diﬀerent stocks has been documented. Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2000) as well as Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) ﬁnd that liquidity of individual
stocks co-moves with industry- and market-wide liquidity. Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) rely on
principle component analysis to extract a latent systematic liquidity factor both across stocks as well
as across liquidity measures. Theoretically, the source of market illiquidity and the link to funding
liquidity have been highlighted by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
Recently, these measures of (systematic) liquidity have been related to equity returns (Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003), Hasbrouck (2006)) and market microstructure noise (Aı¨t-Sahalia and Yu, 2009)
of NYSE stocks. Taking liquidity into account also has important implications in an asset pricing
context as investors require compensation for being exposed to liquidity risk. By augmenting the
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model by a liquidity factor, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) ﬁnd
that aggregate liquidity is a priced risk factor in the cross-section of stock returns. The studies by
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Sadka (2006) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) lend further support
to this hypothesis.
Despite its importance, only very few studies exist on liquidity in FX markets, mainly focusing
on the explanation of the contemporaneous correlation between order ﬂow and exchange rate returns
documented by Evans and Lyons (2002). Using a unique database from a commercial bank, Marsh
and O’Rourke (2005) investigate the eﬀect of customer order ﬂows on exchange rate returns. Based
on price impact regressions, the authors argue that the correlation between order ﬂow and exchange
rate movements varies among diﬀerent groups of customers, suggesting that transitory liquidity ef-
fects do not cause the contemporaneous correlation described by Evans and Lyons (2002). On the
contrary, Breedon and Vitale (2005) support the argument that portfolio balancing temporarily leads
to liquidity risk premiums and, therefore, aﬀects exchange rates as long as dealers hold undesired
inventory. In line with this result, Berger, Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, and Wright (2008) ﬁnd
evidence indicating a prominent role of liquidity eﬀects in the relation between order ﬂow and ex-
change rate movements in their study of Electronic Brokerage System (EBS) data. However, none
of these papers introduces a measure of liquidity or investigates commonality in liquidity as is done
in this paper.
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Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2008) document the proﬁtability of carry
trades, ﬁnding an average annual excess return of close to 5% over the period 1976–2007 for a
simple carry trade strategy. Recently, Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) developed a factor
model in the spirit of Fama and French (1993) for foreign exchange returns. They argue that a single
carry trade risk factor, which is related to the diﬀerence in excess returns for exchange rates with
large and small interest rate diﬀerentials, is able to explain most of the variation in currency excess
returns over uncovered interest rate parity. Menkhoﬀ, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2009) adapt
this model by stressing the role of volatility risk. The rationale for investigating excess returns is the
plethora of papers which document the failure of UIP, rooted in the seminal works of Hansen and
Hodrick (1980) as well as Fama (1984). Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) argue that a time-varying
risk-premium which is negatively correlated with the expected rate of depreciation is economically
plausible and might help to explain the forward bias. A survey of modeling and estimating the risk
premium is presented by Engel (1996). These risk-based explanations for the failure of UIP motivate
the study of excess currency returns in an asset pricing context. The paper at hand contributes to
this strain of literature by showing that liquidity risk is a priced risk factor.
Finally, this paper has implications for crash risk in currency markets (Jurek (2008), Brunner-
meier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009), Farhi, Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere, and Verdelhan (2009)).
Typically funding as well as market liquidity dries up during currency crashes leading to further
selling pressure on the currency. The liquidity measure introduced in this paper helps investors and
central banks to monitor liquidity in FX markets supporting investment and policy decisions.
The next section establishes the basis for the analysis of liquidity in foreign exchange markets by
introducing various liquidity measures.
2. Liquidity Measures
2.1. Return Reversal
In this section, a daily reversal measure of liquidity, inspired by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003), is
developed for high-frequency data. When a currency is illiquid, net buying (selling) pressure leads
to an excessive appreciation (depreciation) of the currency followed by a reversal to the fundamental
value (Campbell, Grossman, and Wang, 1993). The magnitude of this resilience eﬀect determines
liquidity, i.e. the more liquid a currency, the smaller is the temporary price change accompanying
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order ﬂow. This can be modeled as
푝푡푖 − 푝푡푖−1 = 휃푡 + 휑푡(푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖) + 훾푡(푣푏,푡푖−1 − 푣푠,푡푖−1) + 휀푡푖 , (1)
or in shorthand notation
푟푡푖 = 휽푡x푡푖 + 휀푡푖 , (2)
where 푟푡푖 = 푝푡푖 − 푝푡푖−1 is the intraday log-return of a currency, 푣푏,푡푖 and 푣푠,푡푖 denote the buying
and selling volume at time 푡푖, respectively, and 휀푡푖 is an error term. The parameter vector to be
estimated each day is 휽푡 = [휃푡 휑푡 훾푡]. It is expected that the trade impact 휑푡 is positive due
to the supply and demand eﬀect of net buying pressure as presented by Evans and Lyons (2002).
Liquidity at day 푡 is measured by the parameter 훾푡, which is expected to be negative as it captures
return reversal. The intraday frequency should be low enough to distinguish return reversal from
simple bid-ask bouncing. On the other hand, the frequency should be suﬃciently high to obtain an
adequate number of observations for each day, so a good choice is to rely on one minute data.
While having a similar form, there exist a number of important diﬀerences compared to the
liquidity measure of Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003). First of all, order ﬂow is computed as the
diﬀerence between buying and selling volume, whereas Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) approximate
order ﬂow by volume signed by the excess stock return of the same period. The former method is
more accurate if the direction of the trades is known. Furthermore, contemporaneous order ﬂow is
included in Model (1) to account for the fact that order ﬂow is one of the main determinants of
FX returns (Evans and Lyons, 2002). Most importantly, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) developed
a measure for monthly data, whereas the measure at hand is designed to obtain a daily measure
from high-frequency data. Therefore, the intraday reversal measure introduced above is more closely
related to the classical market microstructure literature. It can be derived from structural models
featuring a dichotomy between the fundamental price and the observed price, as for instance in
Glosten and Harris (1988) as well as Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997). In an eﬃcient
market model, security prices move in response to the arrival of new information. However, in practice
various imperfections inherent in the trading process lead to additional intraday price movements.
These two eﬀects can be combined in a joint model:
푝∗푡푖 = 푝
∗
푡푖−1 + 훼푡(푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖) + 휁푡푖 (3)
푝푡푖 = 푝
∗
푡푖 + 훽푡(푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖) + 휉푡푖 . (4)
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In eﬃcient markets, changes in the unobservable fundamental log-price 푝∗푡푖 stem from public news
announcements 휁푡푖 . Moreover, contemporaneous order ﬂow (푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖) is assumed to contain in-
formation of the fundamental asset value as some traders might possess private information. The
strength of the impact of order ﬂow is measured by the coeﬃcient 훼푡, which refers to the degree
of asymmetric information. Observable log-prices 푝푡푖 are set by market makers
1 conditional on the
order ﬂow. If a trade is buyer (seller) initiated, the market maker augments (reduces) the fundamen-
tal price to obtain compensation for transaction cost and inventory risk. Thus 훽푡 reﬂects liquidity
cost, capturing the transitory eﬀect of order ﬂow on asset prices. The term 휉푡푖 represents further
microstructure noise, for instance due to price discreteness.
This structural model of price formation can easily be related to Model (1). Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences
of Equation (4) and relying on (3) yields:
푝푡푖 − 푝푡푖−1 = 푝∗푡푖 − 푝∗푡푖−1 + 훽푡(푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖)− 훽푡(푣푏,푡푖−1 − 푣푠,푡푖−1) + 휉푡푖 − 휉푡푖−1
= (훼푡 + 훽푡)(푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖)− 훽푡(푣푏,푡푖−1 − 푣푠,푡푖−1) + 휁푡푖 + 휉푡푖 − 휉푡푖−1 (5)
≡ (훼푡 + 훽푡)(푣푏,푡푖 − 푣푠,푡푖)− 훽푡(푣푏,푡푖−1 − 푣푠,푡푖−1) + 푢푡푖 + 휂푡푢푡푖−1 ,
which can be estimated using Equation (1) setting (훼푡 + 훽푡) = 휑푡, −훽푡 = 훾푡, and 푢푡푖 + 휂푡푢푡푖−1 = 휀푡푖 .
To summarize, the link between asset returns and lagged order ﬂow is predominantly determined
by liquidity cost, while asymmetric information is the main cause of returns and order ﬂow being
contemporaneously correlated.
2.2. Estimation
The classic choice to estimate Model (1) is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. However, high
frequency data is likely to contain outliers especially if a prior ﬁltering was conducted conservatively.
Unfortunately, classic OLS estimates are adversely aﬀected by these atypical observations which are
separated from the majority of the data. In line with this reasoning, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)
warn that their reversal measure can be very noisy for individual securities.
Removing outliers from the sample is not a meaningful solution since subjective outlier deletion
or algorithms as described by Brownlees and Gallo (2006) have the drawback that there is a risk of
deleting legitimate observations which diminishes the value of the statistical analysis. The approach
adopted in this paper is to rely on robust regression techniques.2 The aim of robust statistics is to
1Market makers may also be traders using limit orders.
2Alternatively, Model (1) can be estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments, which could also be robustiﬁed
(Ronchetti and Trojani, 2001).
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obtain parameter estimates, which are not adversely aﬀected by the presence of potential outliers
(Hampel, Ronchetti, Rousseeuw, and Stahel, 2005). As Model (1) is a simplistic representation
of the unknown true process generating FX returns, it is desirable to obtain accurate parameter
estimates even if the data stems from a perturbed model in the neighborhood of the Model (1).

















if ∣푦∣ ≤ 푘
1 if ∣푦∣ > 푘
. (7)









⎞⎠xti = 0. (8)
Moreover, the constant 푘 = 4.685 ensures 95% eﬃciency of 휽ˆ when 휀푡푖 is normally distributed.
Computationally, the parameters are found using iteratively reweighed least squares with a weighting
function corresponding to the bisquare function (7) and an initial estimate for the residual scale of
휎ˆ = 10.675median
퐼
푖=1 ( ∣휀푡푖 ∣∣ 휀푡푖 ∕= 0).
Compared to standard OLS, by construction robust regression estimates are less inﬂuenced by
potential contamination in the data. Furthermore, standard errors of the robust estimates are
typically smaller as outliers inﬂate conﬁdence intervals of classic OLS estimates (Maronna, Martin,
and Yohai, 2006).
In the next section, alternative measures of liquidity will be presented.
2.3. Alternative Measures of Liquidity
Various measures of liquidity have been introduced in the ﬁnance literature. Due to the fact that
liquidity is a complex concept, each measure captures a diﬀerent facet of liquidity. Consequently,
it is important to consider alternative measures that can be used for comparison with the return
reversal measure. Table 1 summarizes the deﬁnition and units of measurement of all daily liquidity
measures that are utilized in this paper.
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[Table 1 about here.]
The ﬁrst two alternative measures cover the cost aspect of liquidity. In line with the imple-
mentation shortfall approach of Perold (1988), the cost of executing a trade can be assessed by
investigating bid-ask spreads. A market is regarded as liquid if the proportional bid-ask spread is
low. However, in practice trades are not always executed exactly at the posted bid or ask quotes.3
Instead, deals frequently transact at better prices, deeming quoted spread measures inappropriate
for an accurate assessment of execution costs. Therefore, eﬀective cost are computed by comparing
transaction prices with the quotes prevailing at the time of execution. The main advantage of spreads
and eﬀective cost is that these measures can be calculated quickly and easily on a real-time basis. A
drawback, however, is that bid and ask quotes are only valid for limited quantities and amounts of
time, implying that the spread only measures the cost of executing a single trade of restricted size
(Fleming, 2003).
If markets are volatile, market makers require a higher compensation for providing liquidity due
to the additional risk incurred. Therefore, if volatility is high, liquidity tends to be lower and, thus,
volatility can be used as a proxy for liquidity. To that end, volatility is estimated based on ultra-high
frequency data, which allows for a more accurate estimation compared to relying solely on daily or
monthly data. Given the presence of market frictions, utilizing classic realized volatility (RV) is
inappropriate (Aı¨t-Sahalia, Mykland, and Zhang, 2005). Zhang, Mykland, and Aı¨t-Sahalia (2005)
developed a nonparametric estimator which corrects the bias of RV by relying on two time scales.
This two-scale realized volatility (TSRV) estimator consistently recovers volatility even if the data
is subject to microstructure noise.
The last measure used in this paper is the trade impact coeﬃcient 휑푡 in Equation (1), which
can be interpreted as an indirect measure of illiquidity (Kyle, 1985). Following the argument of
Grossman and Stieglitz (1980) agents in the market are not equally well informed, thus, asymmetric
information might lead to illiquidity in the market as, for instance, a potential seller might be afraid
that the buyer has private information. As discussed above, the contemporaneous relation between
order ﬂow and prices can be used to proxy asymmetric information. In foreign exchange markets
asymmetric information might arise for instance in the context of central bank interventions.
As more active markets tend to be more liquid, trading activity measured by the number of
intraday trades is frequently used as an indirect measure of liquidity. Unfortunately, the relation
between liquidity and trading volume is not unambiguous. Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994) show that
3For instance new traders might come in, executing orders at a better price or the spread might widen if the size of an
order is particularly large.
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trading activity is positively related to volatility, which in turn implies lower liquidity. Melvin and
Taylor (2009) document a strong increase in FX trading activity during the ﬁnancial crisis, which
they attribute to “hot potato trading” rather than an increase in market liquidity. Therefore, trading
activity is not used as a proxy for liquidity in this paper. All alternative measures will be applied in
the next section to empirically analyze liquidity in foreign exchange markets.
3. Liquidity in Foreign Exchange Markets
3.1. The Data Set
Next to the fact that the FX market is less transparent than stock and bond markets, the main
reason why liquidity in FX markets has not been studied previously in more detail is the paucity
of available data. However, in recent years two electronic platforms have emerged as the leading
trading systems providing an excellent source of currency trade and quote data. These electronic
limit order books match buyers and sellers automatically, leading to the spot interdealer reference
price. Via the Swiss National Bank it was possible to gain access to a new data set from EBS including
historical data on a one second basis of the most important currency pairs between January 2007
and December 2008. With a market share of more than 60%, EBS has become the leading global
marketplace for interdealer trading in foreign exchange. For the two most important currency pairs,
EUR/USD and USD/JPY, the vast majority of spot trading is represented by the EBS data set
(Chaboud, Chernenko, and Wright, 2007). EBS best bid and ask prices as well as volume indicators
are available to determine the liquidity measures presented above. Furthermore, in this data set the
direction of trades is known, which is crucial for an accurate computation of eﬀective cost and order
ﬂow. See Chaboud, Chernenko, and Wright (2007) for a descriptive study of the EBS database.
In this paper nine currency pairs will be investigated in detail, namely the AUD/USD, EUR/CHF,
EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, EUR/USD, GBP/USD, USD/CAD, USD/CHF and USD/JPY exchange
rates. Further, less frequently traded exchange rates are available, however, increasing the cross-
section would lead to a diminishing accuracy of liquidity estimates. Choosing nine currency pairs
optimally balances the tradeoﬀ between sample size and accuracy. In the EBS system no record is
created if neither prices or volume changed nor a trade occurred, therefore the raw data is brought to
a regular format with 86,400 entries per day to construct second-by-second price and volume series.
Almost 7GB of irregularly spaced raw data were processed to obtain a total of more than 40 million
observations for a single currency pair. At every second the midpoint of best bid and ask quotes or
the transaction price of deals is used to construct one-second log-returns. For the sake of improved
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interpretability, these returns are multiplied by 104 to obtain basis points as the unit of exchange
rate returns. Observations between Friday 10pm to Sunday 10pm GMT4 are excluded since only
minimal trading activity is observed during these non-standard hours. Moreover, US holidays and
other days with unusual light trading activity5 have been dropped from the data set. For four less
frequently traded currency pairs, namely AUD/USD, EUR/GBP, GBP/USD and USD/CAD, the
trading activity during nighttime in both countries is very low leading to irregular moves in quotes.
Hence, these hours are removed prior to computing the daily liquidity measures.
As there are a number of faulty records and obvious outliers in the data6 which need to be
discarded, the data is cleaned using the detection rule proposed by Brownlees and Gallo (2006).
More precisely, the observation at time 푡 is removed from the sample if both the bid as well as the
ask price are zero or if
∣푝푡(훼, 푘)− 푝¯푖(훼, 푘)∣ > 3푠푖(훼, 푘) + 휈, (9)
where 푝¯푖(훼, 푘) and 푠푖(훼, 푘) denote the 훼-trimmed sample mean and standard deviation based on 푘
observations in the neighborhood of 푡, respectively. To avoid zero variance for a sequence of equal
prices, 휈 is added on the right hand side of Equation (9). As the purpose of this ﬁltering is to
only remove the most obvious outliers, 휈 is chosen to be equal to ﬁve pips7. Relying on 훼-trimmed
mean and standard deviation ensures that a given price is compared with valid observations in the
neighborhood. Choosing 훼 = 5% and 푘 = 100 implies that the 100 prices closest to price 푝푡 are
chosen as the neighborhood, however, the largest and smallest 2.5% of these prices are discarded for
the computation of the mean and variance.
As it is impossible to disentangle bid-ask bouncing and reversal eﬀects at the one second frequency,
the data is aggregated to one-minute price series. To that end, one minute order ﬂow and return
series are constructed by summing one second order ﬂow and log-returns.
3.2. Foreign Exchange Liquidity
Using the large data set described in the previous section, liquidity is estimated for each trading day.
Descriptive statistics for exchange rate returns, order ﬂow and various liquidity measures are shown
in Panel I of Table 2.
4GMT is used throughout this paper.
5There are unusually few trades recorded on July 27 and there are no trade records at all between December 3rd and
December 5th, 2007.
6For instance on March 30 one bid quote is 0.803 instead of 0.8073 for AUD/USD; On June 15 two bid quotes are
100.11 instead of 165.1 for EUR/JPY.
7A pip is the smallest price change of a currency and corresponds to 0.01 for JPY and 0.0001 for all other currencies.
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[Table 2 about here.]
Average daily returns reveal that AUD and GBP depreciated, while EUR, CHF and particularly
JPY appreciated during the sample period. For USD/CHF and USD/JPY, the average order ﬂow
is large and positive, nevertheless, USD depreciated against CHF as well as JPY. In line with
expectations, EUR/USD and USD/JPY are traded most frequently while trading activity is the
smallest for AUD/USD and USD/CAD.
Panel II of Table 2 depicts summary statistics of daily estimates for various liquidity measures.
Interestingly, the average return reversal, 훾푡, i.e. the temporary price change accompanying order
ﬂow, is negative and therefore captures illiquidity. The median is larger than the mean indicating
negative skewness in daily liquidity. Depending on the currency pair, one-minute returns are on
average reduced by 0.014 to 0.083 basis points if there was an order ﬂow of 1–5 million in the
previous minute. This reduction is economically signiﬁcant given the fact that average one-minute
returns are virtually zero. In line with the results of Evans and Lyons (2002) as well as Berger,
Chaboud, Chernenko, Howorka, and Wright (2008), the trade impact coeﬃcient, 휑푡, is positive.
Eﬀective cost are smaller than half the bid-ask spread hinting at within quote trading. Annualized
foreign exchange return volatility ranges from 6.9% to almost 17%.
Comparing the liquidity estimates across diﬀerent currencies, EUR/USD seems to be the most
liquid exchange rate, which corresponds to the perception of market participants and the fact that it
has by far the largest market share in terms of turnover (Bank for International Settlements, 2007).
On the other hand, the least liquid currency pairs are USD/CAD and AUD/USD. Despite the fact
that GBP/USD is one of the most important exchange rates, it is estimated to be rather illiquid,
which is explained by the fact that GBP/USD is mostly traded on Reuters rather than the EBS
trading platform (Chaboud, Chernenko, and Wright, 2007). The high liquidity of EUR/CHF and
USD/CHF during the sample period might be related to “ﬂight-to-quality” eﬀects due to save heaven
properties of the Swiss franc (Ranaldo and So¨derlind, 2009). Nevertheless, the overall ranking of
the exchange rates according to their liquidity is in line with market participants’ expectations and
roughly coincides across diﬀerent measures.
All daily liquidity measures of individual exchange rates ﬂuctuate signiﬁcantly over time. For
the return reversal this observation is shared by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) who conclude that
their reversal measure is a rather noisy proxy for liquidity at the individual asset level. To alleviate
this problem, overlapping weekly and monthly liquidity series are constructed by computing time-
series averages of the daily estimates. This “within exchange rate” averaging has similar eﬀects
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as Pa´stor and Stambough’s (2003) approach of computing the cross-sectional mean across stocks.
From Figures 1 and 2, which depict weekly and monthly liquidity respectively, this smoothing eﬀect
becomes apparent.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
While the weekly estimates are still rather noisy, the overlapping monthly estimates exhibit less
variation. Most currencies are relatively stable and liquid at the beginning of the sample. However,
after the subprime crisis started to signiﬁcantly eﬀect ﬁnancial markets in the course of 2007, a
downward trend in liquidity becomes visible for all exchange rates. In line with Melvin and Taylor
(2009), who identify August 16, 2007 to be the start of the crisis in FX markets, liquidity decreased
during the major unwinding of carry trades in August 2007. In the following months liquidity tended
to rebound for most currency pairs before starting a downward trend in the end of 2007. This decline
was mainly due to changes in risk appetite and commodity related selling of investment currencies
which led investors to deleverage by unwinding carry trades. The decrease in liquidity continued
after the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008. In the second quarter of 2008 investors started to
believe that the crisis might be over soon, thus, liquidity increased as investors began to invest again
in FX markets. However, in September 2008, liquidity dramatically dropped following the default
of Lehman Brothers. This decline reﬂects the unprecedented turmoil in ﬁnancial markets caused by
the bankruptcy.
Figure 1 and especially Figure 2 suggest that liquidity co-moves across currencies. Consequently,
commonality in FX liquidity will be investigated in the next section.
4. Commonality in Foreign Exchange Liquidity
Testing for commonality in FX liquidity is crucial as the presence of shocks to market-wide liquidity
has important implications for investors as well as regulators. Therefore, a time-series of systematic
FX liquidity is constructed representing the common component in liquidity across diﬀerent exchange
rates.
4.1. Averaging Liquidity Across Currencies
In the ﬁrst approach, an estimate for market-wide FX liquidity is computed simply as the cross-
sectional average of liquidity at individual exchange rate level. This method of determining aggregate
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liquidity has been applied to equity markets by Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003). Formally, systematic







where 푁 is the number of exchange rates. In order for common liquidity to be less inﬂuenced by
extreme currency pairs, it is estimated by relying on a trimmed mean. More precisely, the currency
pairs with the highest and lowest value for 퐿푗,푡 are excluded in the computation of 퐿
푀
푡 . Systematic
FX liquidity based on diﬀerent measures is depicted in Figure 3. The sign of each measure is adjusted
such that the measure represents liquidity rather than illiquidity. Consequently, an increase in the
measure is associated with higher liquidity.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Bid-ask spreads, volatility and the trade impact coeﬃcient increase towards the end of the sample,
which is in line with the decrease in the reversal measure. All measures uniformly indicate a steep
decline in liquidity after September 2008 when the default of Lehman Brothers as well as the rescue
of American International Group (AIG) took place. The stabilization of liquidity at the very end of
the sample might be related to governments’ eﬀorts to support the ﬁnancial sector, for instance by
initiating the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the United States.
Compared to Pa´stor and Stambough’s (2003) reversal measure for equity markets, aggregate FX
return reversal for monthly data is negative over the whole sample. This desirable result might be
caused by the fact that the EBS data set includes more accurate order ﬂow data and that Model (1)
is estimated robustly at a higher frequency.
Given the estimate of market-wide FX liquidity, basic empirical evidence for commonality in FX
liquidity can be obtained by regressing percentage changes in liquidity of individual exchange rates
on changes in systematic liquidity:
퐷퐿푗,푡 = 훼푗 + 훽푗퐷퐿
푀
푡 + 휀푗,푡, (11)
where 퐷퐿푗,푡 ≡ (퐿푗,푡 − 퐿푗,푡−1)/퐿푗,푡−1 is the relative change of liquidity measure 퐿 for exchange rate
푗. Analogously, 퐷퐿푀푡 is deﬁned for relative changes in market liquidity. Similar to Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2000), relative changes in liquidity, rather than levels, are investigated as the
objective is to highlight co-movement in liquidity. Table 3 shows the regression results.
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[Table 3 about here.]
The cross-sectional average of the slope coeﬃcients 훽푗 is positive and signiﬁcant for all measures.
Of the individual 훽푗 ’s approximately 89% are positive and 78% are positive as well as signiﬁcant
based on the reversal measure while all slopes are positive and signiﬁcant for the alternative mea-
sures. Average adjusted-푅2s are higher than those for daily equity liquidity of Chordia, Roll, and
Subrahmanyam (2000). This ﬁnding might be explained by the fact that daily noise is averaged
out at the monthly horizon. These preliminary results are indicative of strong commonality in FX
liquidity. Investigating commonality more rigorously by relying on principle component analysis will
be the objective of the next section.
4.2. Latent Liquidity
Instead of averaging, Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) rely on principle component analysis (PCA) to
document commonality. To that end, liquidity measure 퐿 for each exchange rate is standardized
by the time-series mean and standard deviation of the average of measure 퐿 obtained from the
cross-section of exchange rates. Then, the ﬁrst three principle components across exchange rates
are extracted for each liquidity measure. Finally, for each currency pair, the time-series of liquidity
measure 퐿 is regressed on the principle components. To assess the level of commonality, the cross-
sectional average of the coeﬃcient of determination as well as the adjusted-푅2 are shown in Table
4.
[Table 4 about here.]
Similar to the regressions in the previous section, Table 4 reveals ample evidence of strong com-
monality. The ﬁrst principle component explains between 70% and 90% of the variation in monthly
FX liquidity depending on which measure is used. As additional support, the (adjusted-) 푅2 in-
creases further when two or three principle components are included as explanetory variables. As in
the previous section, the reversal measure exhibits the lowest level of commonality. Moreover, the 푅2
statistics are still signiﬁcantly larger than those for equity data computed by Korajczyk and Sadka
(2008). To summarize, all empirical results suggest a high level of commonality in FX liquidity.
This commonality is stronger than in equity markets when comparing the results of this paper to
the studies by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) as well as
Korajczyk and Sadka (2008).
Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) take the idea of using PCA to extract common liquidity one step
further. Empirical evidence on commonality and visual inspection of Figure 3 show that alternative
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liquidity measures yield qualitatively similar results. Indeed, the correlation between diﬀerent ag-
gregate liquidity measures is around 0.8 for weekly and 0.9 for monthly data. This high correlation
indicates that all measures proxy for the same underlying liquidity factor. Therefore, Korajczyk
and Sadka (2008) introduce the idea of latent liquidity, combining the information contained in the
various liquidity measures. If each liquidity measure proxies for the same latent liquidity factor, sys-
tematic liquidity can be extracted by assuming a latent factor model for the vector of standardized
liquidity measures, which can again be estimated using PCA. Given that the ﬁrst principle com-
ponent explains the majority of variation in liquidity of individual exchange rates, the ﬁrst latent
factor is used as measure for systematic liquidity. Similar to the simple measures, the sign of the
factor is chosen such that it represents liquidity. Figure 4 illustrates latent market-wide FX liquidity
over time together with the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as well as the
TED-spread.
[Figure 4 about here.]
The graph of systematic FX liquidity estimated by PCA resembles the one obtained by averaging
liquidity of individual exchange rates. Again market-wide FX liquidity decreases after the beginning
of the subprime crisis and there is a steep decline in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
This similarity in estimated common liquidity is conﬁrmed by correlations between 0.8 and 0.9
depending on which measure is used when averaging. More remarkable is the relation to the VIX
and the TED-spread. Primarily an index for the implied volatility of S&P 500 options, the VIX is
frequently used as a proxy for investors’ fear inherent in ﬁnancial markets, whereas the TED-spread
proxies the level of credit risk and funding liquidity in the interbank market. During most of 2007
and 2008, the severe ﬁnancial crisis is reﬂected in a TED-spread which is signiﬁcantly larger than its
long-run average of 30–50 basis points.
Interestingly, the VIX as well as the TED-spread are strongly negatively correlated with FX
liquidity (approximately −0.8 and −0.7 for latent liquidity) indicating that investors’ fear measured
by implied volatility of equity options and credit risk has spillover eﬀects to other ﬁnancial markets as
well. The increasing integration of international ﬁnancial markets might be a reason for this linkage
as, for instance, the default of Lehman Brothers led to severe repercussions in all ﬁnancial markets.
To investigate this issue further, the relation between systematic FX liquidity and liquidity of equity
markets is investigated in the next section.
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4.3. Relation to Liquidity of Equity Markets
Given the high correlation to the VIX, it is promising to investigate commonality in liquidity across
diﬀerent ﬁnancial markets. To that end, the measures of market-wide FX liquidity presented in the
previous subsections are compared to systematic equity liquidity estimated by return reversal as put
forward in Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)8. Figure 5 shows a comparison of liquidity in FX and
equity markets based on a sample of 24 non-overlapping observations.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The results support the notion that liquidity shocks are systematic across markets. Moreover,
the correlation between equity and FX liquidity is 0.46 and 0.34 depending on whether the latter
is obtained from averaging return reversal or from principle component analysis across diﬀerent
liquidity measures. Similarly, a Spearman’s rho of 0.40 and 0.41 indicates co-movement, further
substantiating the ﬁnding of integrated ﬁnancial markets.
Having analyzed liquidity of individual exchange rates and illustrated the strong degree of com-
monality across exchange rates as well as with equity liquidity, the question arises whether systematic
liquidity risk is priced in the cross-section. The presence of such a liquidity risk premium in FX mar-
kets would further underline the importance of the previous analysis.
5. Liquidity Risk Premiums
5.1. Monthly data
To investigate the role of liquidity in cross-sectional asset pricing, monthly dollar log-returns are
constructed from daily spot rates in units of foreign currency per USD. Hence, in contrast to the pre-
vious analysis, all returns are based on USD as base currency, which allows for better interpretation
of the factors. Additional to FX data, interest rates are necessary to construct risk factors and to
analyze liquidity risk premiums as well as excess returns over UIP. Thus, similar to Liu and Maynard
(2005) the interest rate diﬀerential for the various currencies is computed from LIBOR interest rates,
which are obtained from Datastream. LIBOR rates are converted to continuously compounded rates
to allow for comparison with monthly FX log-returns, which are computed at the same point in time.
8Current estimates for the equity liquidity factor are obtained from Lˇubosˇ Pa´stor’s website: http://faculty.
chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/research/liq_data_1962_2008.txt.
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Combining these data sets, the variable of interest is the excess return over UIP:
푟푒푗,푡+1 = 푖
푓
푡 − 푖푑푡 −Δ푝푗,푡+1, (12)
where 푖푓푡 and 푖
푑
푡 represent the one-month foreign and domestic LIBOR interest rates at day 푡, respec-
tively. 푟푒푗,푡+1 denotes the one month excess return of currency pair 푗 at day 푡 from the perspective
of US investors. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the return from a carry trade in which a US
investor who borrows at the domestic and invests in the foreign interest rate is exposed to exchange
rate risk. For the purpose of the asset pricing study, gross excess returns are used, because excess
returns net of bid-ask spreads overestimate the true cost of trading. In practice, foreign exchange
swaps are often preferred over spot trading to maintain currency portfolio positions due to their
minimal trading cost (Gilmore and Hayashi, 2008). Descriptive statistics for exchange rate returns,
interest rate diﬀerentials as well as excess returns are depicted in Table 5.
[Table 5 about here.]
Panel I shows that the annualized returns of individual exchange rates between January 2007 and
December 2008 are very large in absolute value compared to the longer sample of Lustig, Roussanov,
and Verdelhan (2009). While prior to the default of Lehman Brothers (Panel II) the diﬀerence
in magnitude is rather small, extreme average returns of up to 85% per annum occur after the
collapse (Panel III). In general, the interest rate diﬀerentials are lower in absolute value in the last
subsample mirroring the joint eﬀorts of central banks to alleviate the economic downturn by lowering
interest rates. Typical carry trade funding currencies of low interest rate countries (JPY and CHF)
have a positive excess return while the excess return is negative for investment currencies which
are associated with high interest rates (AUD, NZD). This holds true for the whole sample, but the
diﬀerences are more substaintial after September 2008. These negative excess returns indicate an
increased risk and deteriorated proﬁtability of carry trades.
These signiﬁcant excess returns over UIP in combination with the large literature on risk-based
explanations of this failure warrants further analysis. Therefore, a factor model for excess FX returns
including liquidity risk will be presented next.
5.2. Risk Factors for Foreign Exchange Returns
Following the arbitrage pricing theory of Ross (1976), variation in the cross-section of returns is
assumed to be caused by diﬀerent exposure to a small number of risk factors. To estimate a factor
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model and to quantify the market prices of risk, potential factors to explain excess exchange rate
returns are introduced in this section.
The ﬁrst two risk factors are similar to the ones introduced by Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan







and describes the average excess return, i.e. the return for a US investor who goes long in all 푁
exchange rates available in the sample. The second risk factor, 퐻푀퐿푡, is the excess return of a
portfolio which is long the two exchange rates with the largest interest rate diﬀerential and short the
two exchange rates with the smallest interest rate diﬀerential. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a
“slope” or “carry trade risk factor”; see Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) for further details
on the interpretation and construction of these two factors.
Investors might require only a small premium for the absolute level of liquidity of individual
exchange rates as cross-sectional diﬀerences can be accounted for in portfolio strategies. In contrast,
the risk of market-wide shocks to liquidity might command signiﬁcant risk premiums. Therefore, to
obtain a liquidity risk factor, the estimates for systematic liquidity presented above are decomposed
into expected changes and unanticipated shocks. Similar to the approaches of Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) as well as Acharya and Pedersen (2005), a “common liquidity shock risk factor” 퐶퐿푆푃퐶퐴푡
is deﬁned to be the residuals from an AR(2) model ﬁtted to latent systematic liquidity. 퐶퐿푆퐴푉 퐺푡
is analogously deﬁned when using the average liquidity of individual exchange rates as proxy for
aggregate liquidity. Estimating an AR(2) model for the level of systematic liquidity is equivalent to
an AR(1) model for Δ퐿푀푡 . Thus, 퐶퐿푆푡 captures the unpredicted change of liquidity in month 푡.
Figure 6 depicts the time series of risk factors.
[Figure 6 about here.]
In particular after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there are negative shocks to aggregate liquid-
ity independent of which measure has been used to proxy for aggregate liquidity. While the two 퐶퐿푆
measures diﬀer to some extent in the beginning and middle of the sample, they co-move closely after
September 2008. Moreover, the average excess return as well as 퐻푀퐿 are negative during the latter
subperiod. The carry trade risk factor seems to be inﬂuenced by liquidity as the two exhibit a rather
strong correlation of 0.43 for 퐶퐿푆퐴푉 퐺 and 0.51 for 퐶퐿푆푃퐶퐴. Hence, to separate the inﬂuences of
general macro risk and liquidity eﬀects, 퐻푀퐿 is orthogonalized to 퐶퐿푆. To that end, 퐻푀퐿푂푡 is
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deﬁned to be the residuals of the following regression:
퐻푀퐿푡 = 훼0 + 훼1퐶퐿푆푡 + 푢푡. (14)
In particular after the default of Lehman Brothers, the orthogonalized slope factor, 퐻푀퐿푂, is not
as negative as 퐻푀퐿, which can be explained by the fact that liquidity plays an important role in the
increased risk after the default of Lehman Brothers. Furthermore, the period of large unexpected
shocks to aggregate liquidity coincides with a depreciation of USD against the basket of foreign
currencies.
Having described candidate risk factors for explaining excess returns in FX markets, the next
section will introduce asset pricing models to assess the relative importance of the factors and to
compute their associated market prices of risk.
5.3. Cross-sectional Asset Pricing and Market Prices of Risk
This section investigates whether there exists a return premium for illiquidity. To that end, asset
pricing models based on the previously introduced factors will be estimated. As a ﬁrst step, the
model of Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) is augmented by a liquidity risk factor. Thus, the





= 훿퐴퐸푅훽퐴퐸푅,푗 + 훿퐻푀퐿훽퐻푀퐿,푗 + 훿퐶퐿푆훽퐶퐿푆,푗 , (15)
where 훿퐴퐸푅,푡, 훿퐻푀퐿,푡, and 훿퐶퐿푆,푡 denote the market prices of risk. Excess returns of individual
exchange rates are used as dependent variables. Compared to the more common approach of using
portfolios, relying on individual excess returns increases the dispersion around beta estimates, how-
ever, the asymptotic standard errors of factor risk premiums will be lower (Ang, Liu, and Schwarz,
2008). The betas can be obtained from a time-series regression of excess returns on the factors:
푟푒푗,푡 = 훽0,푗 + 훽퐴퐸푅,푗퐴퐸푅푡 + 훽퐻푀퐿,푗퐻푀퐿푡 + 훽퐶퐿푆,푗퐶퐿푆푡 + 휀푗,푡. (16)
It is more convenient to express this expected return-beta factor model in an equivalent stochastic
discount factor (SDF) representation (Cochrane, 2005):
푚푡 = 1− 푏퐴퐸푅퐴퐸푅푡 − 푏퐻푀퐿퐻푀퐿푡 − 푏퐶퐿푆퐶퐿푆푡. (17)
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The factor loadings in the SDF, b = [푏퐴퐸푅 푏퐻푀퐿 푏퐶퐿푆 ], and the market prices of risk, 휹 =
[훿퐴퐸푅 훿퐻푀퐿 훿퐶퐿푆 ], are related by
휹 = 피[ﬀ ′]b,
where 피[ﬀ ′] denotes the variance-covariance matrix of the factors. While 푏푘 can be used to test
whether factor 푘 helps to price assets given the other factors, a signiﬁcant 훿푘 indicates whether
factor 푘 is priced in the cross-section.
Under the assumption of absence of arbitrage opportunities, the excess return of currency 푗








Consequently, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) of Hansen (1982) naturally lends itself
as an ideal estimation technique for the parameters in the discount factor framework. Relying on
Equation (18) as moment conditions, GMM estimates are found by minimizing the weighted sum
of squared pricing errors. Usually, the solution is found in a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step,
the weighting matrix, 푊 , is chosen to be the identity matrix, yielding consistent and asymptotically
normal ﬁrst-step GMM estimates as solution to the minimization problem. Asymptotic eﬃciency
with regard to the speciﬁed set of moment conditions can be achieved by using the inverse of the
long-run variance-covariance matrix of the excess returns in the moment conditions as weighting
matrix. Given the estimated parameters from step one, this long-run variance-covarinace matrix
is estimated using the Newey–West estimator together with the Bartlett kernel (Newey and West,
1987). It is possible to iterate these two steps until convergence, which has been shown to be more
eﬃcient in small samples compared to the two-step GMM estimator (Ferson and Foerster, 1994).
However, the increase in eﬃciency comes at the cost of a potential loss in robustness. Therefore,
parameters will also be estimated by one-step GMM (푊 = 퐼) to reveal possible misspeciﬁcations. To
increase the sample size, overlapping monthly returns are computed for every trading day 푡. Moving
average eﬀects are accounted for by reporting Newey and West (1987) standard errors with 21 lags.
Recalling the diﬀerences in descriptive statistics and due to the severe implications of the Lehman
Brothers collapse for every ﬁnancial market, a structural break in September 2008 is expected.
Contrary to Bear Stearns, the Federal Reserve and US Treasury did not treat Lehman Brothers as
“too big to fail” creating turmoil in ﬁnancial markets that was unlike anything witnessed before
(Melvin and Taylor, 2009). Unfortunately, it is not possible to formally test for such a breakpoint as
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there are not enough observations to reliably estimate the model for the subsample after the default of
Lehman Brothers for comparison. Nevertheless, the focus of the interpretation lies on the estimation
results for the subsample prior to September 13, 2008. Table 6 shows two-stage GMM regression
results for alternative speciﬁcations of the asset pricing model for this subsample. First-stage GMM
results are similar and are therefore omitted for brevity, but are available from the authors upon
request.
[Table 6 about here.]
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 reports estimation results for the benchmark model of Lustig, Rous-
sanov, and Verdelhan (2009). In line with their results, the carry trade risk factor receives a positive
premium of 18% per year. However, similar to the market risk factor, the market price of carry
trade risk is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. On the contrary, the positive estimate for the
market price is signiﬁcant for the models including liquidity risk only, which are shown in columns
two and three. Both using latent liquidity risk as well as aggregate liquidity risk obtained by aver-
aging lead to signiﬁcant market prices of liquidity risk. A currency pair with a 훽퐶퐿푆 of one earns
a risk premium of 7% and 13% per year, depending on whether latent or average liquidity is used
for constructing common liquidity shocks. Furthermore, the factor loadings in the SDF are positive
and signiﬁcant. Consequently, these basic models suggest an important role of liquidity risk while
the general slope factor representing macro risk has diﬃculties in explaining the variation in excess
returns of individual exchange rates.
To support the previous results, columns four to seven of Table 6 show estimation results for asset
pricing models including a combination of three factors. The models in columns four and six augment
the asset pricing model of Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) by a liquidity risk factor. Now,
the market prices of slope and market risk are of the same magnitude as the ones found by Lustig,
Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009), however, both are not signiﬁcant. On the other hand, 퐶퐿푆퐴푉 퐺
and 퐶퐿푆푃퐶퐴 receive a signiﬁcant premium of 10% and 27% in models four and six, respectively.
Moreover, the SDF factor loadings for liquidity risk are positive and signiﬁcant as well, whereas they
are negative and/or not signiﬁcant for 퐻푀퐿. Furthermore, the fourth model including unexpected
shocks to average liquidity yields the smallest pricing errors of all models. Lastly, models ﬁve and
seven include the orthogonalized versions of the carry trade factor. As 퐻푀퐿푂푡 is not an excess
return, one moment condition is lost for the GMM estimation. Again liquidity risk is priced while
the results for 퐻푀퐿푂푡 contradict each other. Overall, the estimation results are clearly indicative
of liquidity risk receiving a signiﬁcant risk premium of as high as 20% per year. This premium is
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large compared to equity liquidity risk premiums (see for instance Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)
and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)), which might be explained by the extraordinary sample period
investigated in this paper. Additionally, liquidity risk helps to price assets in the cross-section of
excess exchange rate returns.
The presence of strong liquidity risk eﬀects is even more remarkable, because every measure of
liquidity will always be an approximation. Thus, the eﬀect of liquidity is in general hard to detect,
since errors in variables typically lead to a downward bias in the estimated regression coeﬃcients
(Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen, 2005). Consequently, ﬁnding signiﬁcant liquidity risk premiums
in a crisis period, which is a challenge for every model, underlines the quality of the liquidity measure
based on return reversal introduced above. Compared to the results of using latent systematic
liquidity extracted from various diﬀerent measures, the results of utilizing unexpected shocks to
average return reversal are qualitatively similar and even lead to smaller pricing errors. Therefore,
for the sample at hand it is not necessary to compute various liquidity measures and conduct a PCA,
as very similar results are obtained when using solely the reversal measure. Moreover, the latter has
the advantage of a clearer interpretation compared to latent liquidity.
Given the the extreme nature of excess returns after the default of Lehman Brothers, none of the
models provides a good ﬁt for the whole sample, supporting the hypothesis of a structural break. 퐽-
statistics reject the null hypothesis of zero pricing errors for all models. GMM estimates are available
form the authors upon request. These results are not surprising as risk aversion and volatility rose
to incredible levels in the aftermath of the default of Lehman Brothers. Dramatic fear in the market
lead to extreme market conditions and an unprecedented deleveraging imposing large losses on ﬁrms
across the industry.
The next section presents evidence regarding the robustness of the results.
6. Robustness Analysis
6.1. Robustness of the Return Reversal Liquidity Measure
To analyze the robustness of the liquidity estimates obtained from the return reversal measure,
Model (1) is estimated only using the ten most busy trading hours of the day. Table 7 shows that
the return reversal measure as well as the alternative measures indicate marginally higher liquidity,
but the diﬀerences are of small magnitude.
[Table 7 about here.]
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Moreover, the liquidity estimates obtained from the return reversal measure are robust to the
choice of sampling frequency. Speciﬁcally, Panel I of Table 8 shows that the results are qualitatively
similar and all conclusions remain valid when estimating Model (1) based on ﬁve minute return and
order ﬂow data. For most currencies the return reversal is even more pronounced compared to one
minute data.
[Table 8 about here.]
Lastly, Model (1) is estimated using OLS regression. As anticipated, the estimates for return
reversal and trading impact are more volatile over time compared to the robust estimates. Panels
II and III of Table 8 show that the standard deviations of return reversals obtained using OLS are
signiﬁcantly larger, highlighting the fact that robust estimation leads to fewer extreme values as
robust regression is less aﬀected by extreme observations. Consequently, relying on robust regression
techniques is preferable.
Having established the robustness of the return reversal liquidity measure, the next section in-
vestigates the robustness of commonality in FX liquidity.
6.2. Robustness of Commonality in FX Liquidity
Being derived from liquidity of individual exchange rates, the proxies for market-wide liquidity are
robust to the estimation technique and sampling frequency of the individual liquidity measures as
well. Figure 7 contrasts the evolution of estimates for systematic liquidity based on diﬀerent sampling
frequencies and estimation techniques.
[Figure 7 about here.]
When using ﬁve minute data or OLS estimation, the characteristics of the common liquidity series
do not change signiﬁcantly, thus, estimated market-wide FX liquidity continues to mirror important
crisis events. Next, the stability of liquidity risk premiums will be investigated.
6.3. Robustness of Liquidity Risk Premiums
To test the robustness of liquidity risk premiums, the factor models for FX excess returns are re-
estimated using diﬀerent base currencies. As before, Tables 9 and 10 indicate the presence of liquidity
risk premiums when using CHF or AUD as base currency. These currencies are of particular interest
as they represent funding and investment currencies of carry trades. Thus, the conclusion that
liquidity risk receives a signiﬁcant risk premium is robust to the choice of base currency.
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[Table 9 about here.]
[Table 10 about here.]
As alternative to using overlapping monthly data, the asset pricing analysis is repeated with
non-overlapping weekly data. GMM estimation results are shown in Table 11. Due to the fact that
there are only 83 observations, ﬁrst-stage GMM is preferable over two-stage GMM for robustness
considerations (Cochrane, 2005). Again, the estimation results are indicative of large FX liquidity
risk premiums. However, as had to be expected, the standard errors are large due to the short sample
and the noise inherent in weekly return data.
[Table 11 about here.]
As further robustness check secured overnight index swaps (OIS) could be used instead of LIBOR
rates for the computation of excess exchange rate returns. During the ﬁnancial crisis, LIBOR rates
tended to be larger than OIS rates due to embedded risk premiums. However, the magnitude
of interest rates compared to FX returns is very small, in particular after the default of Lehman
Brothers where diﬀerences between OIS and LIBOR are most pronounced. Consequently, the choice
of interest rate does not qualitatively aﬀect the ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant liquidity risk premium.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, a return reversal liquidity measure for foreign exchange markets based on ultra-high
frequency data has been developed. Using a large and comprehensive data set representing the
interdealer FX spot market from January 2007 to December 2008, an empirical analysis of nine
exchange rates illustrates that the reversal measure is in line with market participants perception of
liquidity and mirrors important events during the ﬁnancial crisis 2007–?. After developing measures
for market-wide FX liquidity, it has been shown that liquidity of exchange rates exhibit a high
degree of commonality. An extended factor model indicates that liquidity plays an important role
in explaining the cross-sectional variation of excess currency returns. These results have several
important implications. First of all, the results allow central banks to better assess the eﬀectiveness
of their policy by enabling them to monitor liquidity on a daily basis. Second, stressing the important
role of liquidity helps carry traders to more adequately understand the risk of their investment, which
is crucial in light of the potential losses from currency crashes coinciding with liquidity spirals.
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For future research, it is interesting to investigate FX liquidity over an extended sample which
also includes non-crisis periods. Moreover, the large and high-frequency data set allows for a de-
tailed analysis of intraday patterns in FX returns and liquidity, in particular in conjunction with
investigating the impact of news announcements.
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Figure 1: Weekly liquidity estimates measured by return reversal using robust regression. A stronger
(more negative) reversal indicates low liquidity as the temporary price change accompanying
order ﬂow is large: Panel (a) depicts liquidity over time for the most liquid exchange rates
(EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, USD/JPY); Panel (b) shows return reversal for intermediate currency
pairs (EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, USD/CHF), whereas the time series of liquidity estimates for
the most illiquid currencies (GBP/USD, USD/CAD, AUD/USD) are plotted in Panel (c).
Each observation 푡 represents estimated liquidity for the week following trading day 푡. The
sample is January 3, 2007 – December 22, 2008 (487 observations).
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Figure 2: Monthly liquidity estimates measured by return reversal using robust regression. A stronger
(more negative) reversal indicates low liquidity as the temporary price change accompanying
order ﬂow is large: Panel (a) depicts liquidity over time for the most liquid exchange rates
(EUR/USD, EUR/CHF, USD/JPY); Panel (b) shows return reversal for intermediate currency
pairs (EUR/GBP, EUR/JPY, USD/CHF), whereas the time series of liquidity estimates for
the most illiquid currencies (GBP/USD, USD/CAD, AUD/USD) are plotted in Panel (c).
Each observation 푡 represents estimated liquidity for the month following trading day 푡. The
sample is January 3, 2007 – December 1, 2008 (472 observations).
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Figure 3: Systematic liquidity based on averaging diﬀerent measures (within measures). The sign of
each measure is adjusted such that the measure represents liquidity rather than illiquidity.
Every trading day 푡, overlapping weekly as well as monthly estimates of aggregate liquidity
are constructed by computing the trimmed mean of liquidity measure 푙 in the cross-section
of exchange rates. In Panel (a) each observation 푡 represents estimated liquidity for the week
following trading day 푡. The sample is January 3, 2007 – December 22, 2008 (487 observa-
tions). Panel (b) shows monthly systematic liquidity estimates. Each observation 푡 represents
estimated systematic liquidity for the month following trading day 푡. The sample is January
3, 2007 – December 1, 2008 (472 observations).
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latent systematic liquidity
negative of VIX CBOE volatiltiy index (in %)
negative of TED−spread (times 10)
Figure 4: Latent systematic liquidity based on principle component analysis (across measures). The liq-
uidity measure 퐿 for each exchange rate is standardized by the time-series mean and standard
deviation of the average of liquidity measure 퐿 obtained from the cross-section of exchange
rates. Assuming a latent factor model for the vector of standardized liquidity measures, sys-
tematic liquidity is extracted as the ﬁrst principle component. The sign of the latent liquidity
factor is adjusted such that the measure represents liquidity rather than illiquidity. Each
observation 푡 represents estimated systematic liquidity for the month following trading day
푡. Furthermore, overlapping monthly averages of the negative of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as well as the TED-spread are plotted for comparison. The
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P&S equity liquidity (left axis)
Latent FX liquidity from PCA (right axis)
(b)
Figure 5: Comparison of non-overlapping monthly liquidity estimates for equity markets (measured by
the return reversal measure of Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003)) and systematic FX liquidity.
Panel (a) shows the average FX return reversal obtained from Model (1), whereas latent FX
liquidity obtained from PCA across diﬀerent liquidity measures is plotted in Panel (b). Each
observation 푡 represents estimated liquidity for a given month. The sample is January 2007 –
December 2008 (24 observations).
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carry trade risk factor: HML
orthogonalized carry trade risk factor: HMLO,PCA
orthogonalized carry trade risk factor: HMLO,AVG
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unexpected shocks to common liquidity: CLSAVG
unexpected shocks to latent common liquidity: CLSPCA
(c)
Figure 6: Time series of risk factors: Panel (a) depicts the market risk factor 퐴퐸푅 which is constructed
as the average excess return from investing in an equally weighted portfolio of foreign curren-
cies from the perspective of a US investor. In Panel (b) slope or carry trade factors are shown.
The solid line is the excess return of a portfolio which is long the two exchange rates with
largest interest rate diﬀerential and short the two exchange rates with the smallest interest
rate diﬀerential. The dotted and dashed lines represent the same factor which has been or-
thogonalized to unexpected liquidity risk constructed from PCA and averaging, respectively.
These liquidity risk factors are shown in Panel (c). Unexpected shocks are obtained by ﬁtting
an AR(2) model to the measures of systematic FX liquidity and using the residuals as risk




























Figure 7: Systematic liquidity based on averaging diﬀerent measures (within measures) as well as latent
liquidity obtained from PCA for diﬀerent sampling frequencies and estimation techniques.
The sign of each measure is adjusted such that the measure represents liquidity rather than
illiquidity. Every trading day 푡, overlapping monthly estimates of aggregate liquidity are
constructed by computing the trimmed mean of return reversal in the cross-section of exchange
rates.
In order to estimate latent systematic liquidity, liquidity measure 퐿 for each exchange rate
is standardized by the time-series mean and standard deviation of the average of liquidity
measure 퐿 obtained from the cross-section of exchange rates. Assuming a latent factor model
for the vector of standardized liquidity measures, systematic liquidity is extracted as the ﬁrst
principle component.
The diﬀerent series correspond to diﬀerent intra-day sampling frequencies (one-minute and ﬁve-
minute data) to compute the liquidity measures, as well as diﬀerent estimation techniques (OLS
and robust regression) used to estimate Model (1). Each observation 푡 represents estimated
systematic liquidity for the month following trading day 푡. The sample is January 3, 2007 –
December 1, 2008 (472 observations).
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Table 1: Deﬁnition of daily liquidity measures
Liquidity measures Deﬁnition Units
Return reversal 훾푡 basis points, per minute
Quoted bid-ask spreads 푆 = (푃퐴 − 푃퐵)/푃푀 basis points
Eﬀective cost 퐸 =
{
(푃 − 푃푀 )/푃푀 for buy orders
(푃푀 − 푃 )/푃푀 for sell orders
basis points
Return volatility Two-scale realized volatility percentage, annualized
Trade impact coeﬃcient 휌푡 basis points, per minute
Notes: This table shows the deﬁnition and unit of measurement of the various liquidity measures.
푃 denotes the transaction price, whereas the superscripts 퐴, 퐵 and 푀 indicate the ask, bid and mid
quote, respectively. Trade impact and the reversal measure are the coeﬃcients of contemporaneous
and lagged order ﬂow in a regression of one minute returns on these explanatory variables, which is


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Basic evidence for commonality
liquidity measure 훽 % positive % + signiﬁcant Adjusted-푅2
return reversal 0.96 88.9% 77.8% 0.44
(0.31)
bid-ask spread 0.85 100.0% 100.0% 0.67
(0.03)
eﬀective cost 1.03 100.0% 100.0% 0.68
(0.03)
return volatility 0.91 100.0% 100.0% 0.67
(0.03)
trade impact 1.15 100.0% 100.0% 0.68
(0.03)
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the time-series of
relative changes in individual exchange rate liquidity on relative
changes in systematic liquidity. The ﬁrst column reports the cross-
sectional average of slope coeﬃcients with standard errors in parenthesis.
The second and third column give the percentages of estimates which are
positive (column two) as well as positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero (column three). The last column shows the adjusted-푅2.
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Table 4: Commonality using within measure common factors
Measure Statistic Factor 1 Factors 1,2 Factors 1,2,3
return reversal 푅2 0.7011 0.7745 0.8275
Adjusted-푅2 0.7004 0.7734 0.8263
bid-ask spread 푅2 0.9025 0.9431 0.9599
Adjusted-푅2 0.9023 0.9428 0.9597
eﬀective cost 푅2 0.8468 0.8885 0.9019
Adjusted-푅2 0.8465 0.8879 0.9012
return volatility 푅2 0.8482 0.8819 0.9096
Adjusted-푅2 0.8478 0.8813 0.9089
trade impact 푅2 0.7896 0.8494 0.9656
Adjusted-푅2 0.7891 0.8487 0.9654
Notes: For each standardized measure of liquidity the ﬁrst three
common factors are extracted using principle component analysis.
Then, for each exchange rate and each standardized liquidity measure,
liquidity is regressed on its common factors. The table shows the
average 푅2 and the mean adjusted-푅2 of these regressions using one,
two and three factors.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for monthly data
Currency JPY CHD CAD EUR SEK DKK GBP AUD NZD
Panel I: Whole sample (427 observations)
FX return: Δ푝푗,푡+1
Mean −13.63 −2.80 2.76 −1.04 7.32 −0.87 12.89 11.71 14.87
Std 11.99 12.63 14.93 13.52 15.19 13.42 13.21 20.99 18.35
Interest rate diﬀerential: 푖푓푡 − 푖푑푡
Mean −3.23 −1.56 0.03 0.33 0.36 0.66 1.72 2.92 4.42
Std 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.41 0.51 0.46 0.31 0.48 0.40
Excess return: 푟푒푗,푡+1
Mean 10.39 1.24 −2.73 1.37 −6.97 1.53 −11.17 −8.79 −10.45
Std 12.02 12.57 14.87 13.44 15.02 13.37 13.11 20.83 18.19
Panel II: Prior to default of Lehman Brothers (350 observations)
FX return: Δ푝푗,푡+1
Mean −4.53 −7.07 −7.33 −7.36 −6.64 −7.08 0.83 −4.51 1.83
Std 10.73 11.37 10.50 9.30 10.52 9.29 8.47 14.48 15.25
Interest rate diﬀerential: 푖푓푡 − 푖푑푡
Mean −3.51 −1.77 −0.07 0.03 −0.03 0.26 1.55 2.66 4.20
Std 0.36 0.36 0.21 0.39 0.49 0.40 0.31 0.49 0.41
Excess return: 푟푒푗,푡+1
Mean 1.03 5.31 7.25 7.38 6.62 7.34 0.72 7.17 2.37
Std 10.65 11.32 10.41 9.20 10.42 9.18 8.38 14.35 15.11
Panel III: After default of Lehman Brothers (77 observations)
FX return: Δ푝푗,푡+1
Mean −54.96 16.64 48.64 27.65 70.82 27.34 67.74 85.46 74.11
Std 10.08 16.17 22.96 23.30 19.21 23.05 18.40 30.77 21.39
Interest rate diﬀerential: 푖푓푡 − 푖푑푡
Mean −1.98 −0.61 0.50 1.68 2.10 2.48 2.49 4.10 5.40
Std 0.25 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.30 0.14 0.17 0.14
Excess return: 푟푒푗,푡+1
Mean 52.98 −17.26 −48.14 −25.97 −68.72 −24.85 −65.24 −81.36 −68.71
Std 10.11 16.20 23.01 23.39 19.33 23.31 18.45 30.73 21.37
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for diﬀerent exchange rates with USD being the
base currency. Namely, the average log-return, the average interest rate diﬀerential as well as
monthly excess log-returns over UIP are shown.
Panel I gives results for the whole sample which contains 427 observations and ranges from
March 8, 2007 to November 26, 2008. Summary statistics for two subsamples prior to and
after the default of Lehman Brothers are reported in Panels II and III, respectively.
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Table 6: Two-stage GMM estimation results prior to default of Lehman Brothers, USD as base currency
(March 8, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
훿퐴퐸푅 11.43 4.47 8.66 4.34 4.30
(7.26) (5.90) (5.90) (11.36) (8.08)




훿퐶퐿푆 6.98 10.03 2.92
(1.25) (3.03) (0.54)
훿퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 13.16 27.13 20.35
(3.35) (17.77) (7.85)
푏퐴퐸푅 0.13 0.13 0.13 −0.03 0.00
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)




푏퐶퐿푆 1.37 2.11 0.60
(0.25) (0.53) (0.12)
푏퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 0.26 0.75 0.40
(0.07) (0.24) (0.13)
퐽-stat 0.0467 0.0359 0.0444 0.0272 0.0427 0.0349 0.0343
푝-value 6.03% 24.91% 11.35% 29.98% 3.65% 14.14% 15.08%
Notes: This table reports two-stage GMM estimation results for the sample
prior to the default of Lehman Brothers (March 8, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
for various asset pricing models. The estimates corresponding to risk factors
of seven diﬀerent models are shown. Annualized excess returns of individual
currencies are used as test assets for the moment conditions. The upper part
of the table shows the market prices of risk while the lower part reports SDF
factor loadings. Newey–West standard errors with 21 lags, accounting for
overlapping observations are shown in parenthesis. USD is the base currency.
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Table 7: Daily liquidity measures based on most busy trading hours
EUR/CHF EUR/JPY EUR/USD USD/CHF USD/JPY
busy hours (GMT) 8am–5pm 1am–5pm 8am–8pm 8am–8pm 1am–8pm
return reversal mean -0.024 -0.037 -0.014 -0.017 -0.023
(in bps) median -0.020 -0.029 -0.011 -0.014 -0.021
std 0.023 0.037 0.013 0.029 0.018
bid-ask spread mean 2.16 2.21 1.08 2.56 1.55
(in bps) median 1.80 1.86 0.96 2.20 1.43
std 1.30 1.07 0.32 1.21 0.52
eﬀective cost mean 0.40 0.51 0.46 0.56 0.58
(in bps) median 0.37 0.44 0.42 0.54 0.54
std 0.15 0.29 0.10 0.14 0.19
volatility (in %, mean 6.69 14.09 9.44 11.10 12.46
annualized) median 5.34 10.33 7.55 9.59 10.74
std 4.69 10.85 5.53 5.57 7.15
trade impact mean 0.177 0.347 0.141 0.282 0.224
(in bps) median 0.156 0.285 0.120 0.259 0.202
std 0.080 0.204 0.071 0.090 0.099
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for various daily measures of liquidity, which are
computed based on the most busy trading hours only. Return reversal is the robustly
estimated coeﬃcient of lagged order ﬂow in a regression of one minute returns on
contemporaneous and lagged order ﬂow. Bid-ask spread denotes the average proportional
bid-ask computed using intraday data for each trading day. Eﬀective cost is the average
diﬀerence between the transaction price and the bid/ask quote prevailing at the time of the
trade. Volatility for each trading day is estimated using TSRV. It is expressed in percent
on an annual basis. Trade impact is the coeﬃcient of contemporaneous order ﬂow in the
same regression as the one used to obtain return reversal. The sample, which starts on





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Two-stage GMM estimation results prior to default of Lehman Brothers, CHF as base currency
(March 8, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
훿퐴퐸푅 3.40 −19.62 −18.02 −9.92 −4.82
(11.69) (10.82) (12.05) (13.21) (12.79)




훿퐶퐿푆 6.70 10.65 12.41
(2.33) (3.57) (3.29)
훿퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 14.72 11.33 19.28
(4.05) (13.04) (8.54)
푏퐴퐸푅 0.04 −0.17 −0.16 −0.17 −0.16
(0.01) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)




푏퐶퐿푆 1.32 2.28 2.41
(0.46) (0.60) (0.67)
푏퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 0.29 0.44 0.43
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
퐽-stat 0.0431 0.0408 0.0439 0.0246 0.0353 0.0435 0.0399
푝-value 8.90% 11.29% 8.11% 37.56% 8.96% 5.50% 5.21%
Notes: This table reports two-stage GMM estimation results for the sample
prior to the default of Lehman Brothers (March 8, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
for various asset pricing models. The estimates corresponding to risk factors
of seven diﬀerent models are shown. Annualized excess returns of individual
currencies are used as test assets for the moment conditions. The upper part
of the table shows the market prices of risk while the lower part reports SDF
factor loadings. Newey–West standard errors with 21 lags, accounting for
overlapping observations are shown in parenthesis. CHF is the base currency.
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Table 10: Two-stage GMM estimation results prior to default of Lehman Brothers, AUD as base currency
(March 8, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
훿퐴퐸푅 −16.78 −19.39 −21.20 2.64 −11.95
(9.91) (7.85) (6.18) (13.87) (10.38)




훿퐶퐿푆 6.58 7.83 7.38
(1.21) (2.88) (2.42)
훿퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 13.93 19.88 8.81
(3.15) (17.84) (8.64)
푏퐴퐸푅 −0.20 −0.15 −0.16 −0.01 −0.17
(−0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)




푏퐶퐿푆 1.30 1.78 1.42
(0.24) (0.46) (0.49)
푏퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 0.27 0.62 0.23
(0.06) (0.19) (0.14)
퐽-stat 0.0448 0.0349 0.0446 0.0250 0.0318 0.0377 0.0314
푝-value 7.38% 20.13% 7.52% 36.37% 13.28% 10.50% 13.86%
Notes: This table reports two-stage GMM estimation results for the sample
prior to the default of Lehman Brothers (March 8, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
for various asset pricing models. The estimates corresponding to risk factors
of seven diﬀerent models are shown. Annusalized excess returns of individual
currencies are used as test assets for the moment conditions. The upper part
of the table shows the market prices of risk while the lower part reports SDF
factor loadings. Newey–West standard errors with 21 lags, accounting for
overlapping observations are shown in parenthesis. AUD is the base currency.
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Table 11: One-stage GMM estimation results for weekly data prior to default of Lehman Brothers, USD
as base currency (January 18, 2007 – September 13, 2008)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
훿퐴퐸푅 5.64 1.16 5.15 5.81 5.83
(7.26) (1.82) (7.51) (8.74) (8.97)




훿퐶퐿푆 36.84 67.69 55.05
(26.41) (23.39) (31.06)
훿퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 11.21 52.45 54.69
(13.00) (73.07) (69.95)
푏퐴퐸푅 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.15
(0.02) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)




푏퐶퐿푆 0.25 0.47 0.38
(0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
푏퐶퐿푆푙푎푡푒푛푡 0.08 0.09 0.10
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
퐽-stat 0.9996 0.8714 0.9410 0.5735 0.0815 0.9264 0.0786
푝-value 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 45.37% 0.00% 47.97%
Notes: This table reports one-stage GMM estimation results for weekly data
(non-overlapping) prior to the default of Lehman Brothers (January 18, 2007 –
September 13, 2008) for various asset pricing models. The estimates corres-
ponding to risk factors of seven diﬀerent models are shown. Annualized excess
returns of individual currencies are used as test assets for the moment
conditions. The upper part of the table shows the market prices of risk while
the lower part reports SDF factor loadings. USD is the base currency.
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